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Introduction 
From the mid-1980s to the present day, the idea of the victim, and the material 
structures through which victimization is defined, have increasingly been shaped and 
influenced by cultural forces. To grasp both the processes through which meanings 
are attributed to victims and the institutional networks that emerge in response to 
victimhood, due consideration needs to be given to the broader cultural and political 
context within which notions of criminality and victimization are located. It is our 
intention to consider the changing place of the victim in society through an evaluation 
of prevalent political discourses, media representations and policy shifts. In this 
second edition of the chapter, we wish to revisit popular sociocultural theories and 
cogitate on their capacity to explain recent transformations in contemporary policy 
making and practice. In order to advance research in the area of cultural victimology, 
we begin by addressing the relationship between dominant understandings of the 
victim and the operation of cultural processes. Having highlighted the incremental 
gravitation toward culture as an explanatory force within criminology, we go on to 
explore the ways in which the media represents and influences the range of meanings 
commonly attributed to victims. Here we ask who is entitled to be classified as a 
victim, by whom and under which circumstances? In theoretical terms, moving 
through the risk and fear paradigms adopted by Beck (1992; 1999) and Furedi (2002; 
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2005) to approaches that foreground the concept of resilience, we show how 
imaginings of the universal victim conceal power relations, reveal the proclivities of 
the neo-liberal State and act in the interests of private security operators. Prior to 
stacking up this somewhat bold and disparate set of assertions, it is first necessary to 
consider the evolving nature and meaning of the victim. 
 
Criminology, Culture and Victims’ Rights 
The societal visibility of victims has continued to grow since the first edition of this 
chapter a decade ago. Globally, groups campaigning for victims’ rights have grown in 
size and scale, the mass media focus on victims has further intensified and criminal 
and legal processes have increasingly factored in the interests of victims (see 
Ginsberg, 2014). In addition, the international political currency that can be gained 
from championing the rights of victims - from those that perished in the Bhopal 
disaster to the families of those killed in the Hillsborough disaster - is sizeable. In line 
with this cultural, political and legal focus, competing explanations of the role and 
place of the victim in society have developed in the criminological literature (see 
McGarry and Walklate, 2015: 35). The positioning of victims is relational and 
connects to wider political, social and macro-economic factors. Strands of ‘punitive’ 
or ‘penal’ populism (see Pratt and Clark, 2005) - which consolidated across political 
lines in the 1990s - remain alive and kicking in Britain today, with something of a 
cross-party consensus in terms of approaches to crime control. The Labour Party, the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition and the Conservative Party have all 
espoused varying pitches of ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric and this aligns with the rising 
profile of victims in society. Manifestations include the Labour Party lobbying the 
coalition government ahead of the 2015 general election to formally entrench victims’ 
 3 
rights in charter to bring the UK in line with the USA, the Council of Europe and the 
European Court of Human Rights. While the emphases on aligning with European 
approaches in the UK may wane following Britain’s exit from the European Union, 
the Conservative party had already proposed to extend the services offered to victims 
following a consultation on the 2015 Code of Practice for Victims of Crime. While 
not new, the focus on victims is a relatively recent phenomenon. Up until the late 
twentieth century, expenditure on crime control in most Western nations had been 
skewed toward preventing crime, rather than resourcing the needs of victims. This 
unevenness was reflected in mainstream criminology which has been largely offender 
rather than victim focussed. Although criminological studies in victimology are now 
firmly established, this has historically been overshadowed by a predominant focus on 
perpetrators, sentencing, policing and preventative legislation. In the last three 
decades, the victim has moved from the margins to the centre of debates about crime 
and violence, with interest in victimization in the academy rising alongside the growth 
in political initiatives oriented toward the victim and the expansion of victim support 
networks (see McGarry and Walklate 2015: 36; Zedner, 2002: 420).  
Of course, the various turns toward the victim that have occurred can be 
indexed to deeper and wider transitions (see Mythen, 2014: 70; O’Malley, 2006). One 
of the outcomes of these transitions has been an attempt to reduce crime rates by 
raising awareness about crime and informing the public about strategies of victim 
avoidance. A further consequence of such consciousness raising initiatives has been a 
reported rise in public fears about crime and mounting numbers of people classifying 
themselves as victims of crime. To give some indication of the scale of 
transformation, in 2003-2004 the UK Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority 
(CICA) paid out 2 million pounds to victims of violent crime. By 2015-2016 annual 
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compensation awards exceeded 150 million pounds.1 In the 1980s and 1990s 
government, state agencies and policy researchers became progressively interested in 
victims, both as identifiable individual parties and collective marginalized groups. 
Accordingly, the plight of the ‘victim’ has ascended the political ladder, so much so 
that the category of victim acts as a key instrument of penal repression and policy 
formation around law and order (see Garland, 2001, Rock, 2002). The victim has 
become more visible in political debates about crime and victim’s rights have 
assumed a pivotal role in public policy making. In recent years, the suffering of 
victims has been used to provide leverage for new legislation, such as Megan’s Law 
and the PATRIOT Act in the United States (US). Arguably, there has been a nascent 
cultural shift in the way criminal justice is conceived of and delivered, characterised 
by an individualisation of victimisation. Manifestations of this include the naming of 
criminal justice policy after victims, the blurring of distinctions between legal 
decision-making and victim’s wishes, granting families of victims in the US the right 
to view executions and a rationale of punishment less focused on the collective and 
social function of the criminal justice system and instead oriented to a logic of ‘just 
deserts’. As Ginsberg (2014) observes, this has given rise to certain discursive 
framings of victims’ rights which risk privileging the victim over wider society. It 
ignores the material, historical, and social foundations from which conflicts arise and 
often perceives of few solutions to crime beyond more severe sanctions and 
retributive punishments. Such a pattern of administering ‘justice’ has resulted in a 
culture of incarceration in the UK and the US which cannot be divorced from the 
ways in which victimhood has been elevated in recent decades. It also reflects wider 
inequalities and cleavages of race, class and gender, effectively polarizing the 
populous before the eyes of the law (see Hudson, 2006). The Black Lives Matter 
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movement, for example, has challenged disparities between the treatment of citizens 
at the hands of criminal justice agents globally and drawn attention to what Taylor 
(2016: 107) calls the ‘double standard of justice’. While victims of crime do now 
figure as an integral part of constructing and delivering justice in principle, who 
actually qualifies as deserving of justice in the first place remains as problematic as it 
ever has been. 
So, where place culture in such transformations? This is not a straightforward 
question to respond to and one which requires gentle unpacking. Despite the 
conceptual and definitional untidiness of culture (see Barker, 2000: 35), it can be 
usefully marshalled to enhance understandings of the nature, experiences and role of 
victims in society. Naturally, we cannot hope - nor did we ought to hope - to impose a 
single definitive meaning on culture. Following Raymond Williams (1981), here we 
conceive of culture as way(s) of life that involve institutions and modes of cultural 
production, including the organisation of signs and symbols through which sense 
making takes place. In this context, culture can be viewed as the collective symbolic 
environment in which individuals and social groups interact and generate meaning 
(see Ferrell, 2005: 140). It needs to be recognised that within the broad church that is 
culture, different methodological approaches can be taken according to one’s research 
questions and theoretical trajectory (O’Brien, 2005: 606). 
But what utility and resonances does culture have for criminology in general 
and victimology specifically? If we travel with Williams’ earlier definition of culture - 
as both a way of life and a site of meaning making through symbolic practices - it 
follows that culture is at the heart of the process of victimization, from the habitual 
activities of offenders to institutional modes of caring for those who suffer crime. 
Being or becoming a victim is not a neat or absolute journey (Rock, 2002). Acquiring 
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the status of victim involves being party to a range of interactions and processes, 
including identification, labelling and recognition. As such, the contemporary politics 
of crime victimization cannot be other than a cultural issue and one which provokes 
considerable ethical dilemmas and moral conflicts. Ergo, it is not difficult to state the 
case for further working up of the cultural within criminology, particularly in the area 
of victimology. The work of Ferrell (1999; 2005), Presdee (2000) and Hayward 
(2004) catalysed the development of cultural criminology and increasing emphasis 
being placed on ‘crime and its control in the context of culture; that is, viewing both 
crime and the agencies of control as cultural products - as creative constructs’ 
(Hayward and Young, 2004: 259). Thus, cultural criminology has been alert to the 
power of mass media in contemporary culture and the salience of symbolic images in 
shaping dominant understandings of criminalization, regulation and victimization (see 
Greer, 2005: 174). Despite having its finger on the social pulse, it is fair to say that 
cultural criminology remains a scattered field of loosely connected approaches 
(Spencer, 2011), ranging from studies of urban culture to the association between risk 
taking and criminality. While we will return to critiques of cultural criminology in the 
conclusion, one can see how the core set of concerns developed within cultural 
criminology are equally well equipped to consider the ways in which victims come to 
recognise themselves as victims through engagement with cultural products and 
practices. Thus, cultural criminology in particular - and criminology in the round - can 
benefit from further reflection on the ways in which the victim is culturally 
constructed and socially remade.  
 
The Media, Risk and Victims: Witnessing Suffering or Turning a Blind Eye? 
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The mass media has historically been identified as an important source of information 
about crime and a vehicle through which victimization is rendered visible. Given the 
ubiquity of media technologies in the modern world, it is likely that various forms of 
media play an increasingly central role in informing and cultivating people’s everyday 
perceptions of crime, disorder and victimization. It has commonly been argued that - 
far from reflecting objective crime realities that exist ‘out there’ - the political 
economy in which news media operate, the professional interests of journalists and 
the technical needs of the production process mean that news making is an inherently 
selective and partial activity (see Greer, 2005: 158; Mythen, 2014: 81). The 
production of news impacts not only upon people’s knowledge of crime but on their 
attitudes toward victims and offenders. The classic research of Cohen (1972) and Hall 
et al., (1978) articulates the cycle through which repeated portrayals of law breaking 
subcultures can stimulate moral panics about deviant groups. Despite technological 
diversity in contemporary society, the media sources that people use most frequently 
for information about crime and violence - such as social media, online news sites, 
newspapers and national broadcast news - can serve to promote anxieties and 
uncertainties. Through representations of crime victimization, the media creates 
symbolic identities for sufferers of crime (see Ferrell, 2005: 149). Within this mise en 
scene, the needs and interests of victims can easily be (mis)represented to satisfy the 
preferences of multi-media conglomerations and/or the objectives of self-seeking 
politicians. This point is aptly illustrated by the experiences of Professor John Tulloch 
(2006) who found himself party to all manner of media demands as a consequence of 
surviving the 7/7 bombings in London. Tulloch’s story forces us to think long and 
hard about how victims are ascribed roles and what the ramifications of victim 
identities are for understanding the nature and causes of crimes such as terrorism. It is 
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precisely because the survivors of 7/7 were party to an attack that deeply offended the 
moral sensibilities of ‘ordinary people’ that the UK government decided to increase 
compensation paid to victims. What is at play here is essentially a moral judgement 
about degrees of suffering, gauged in terms of cultural proximity and perceived 
psychological impact rather than a decision determined solely by physiological 
disability. Thus, victims of terrorism are culturally constructed as more important and 
deserving of sympathy than victims of other violent crimes, such as corporate 
homicide. Put bluntly, some victims are more equal than others. 
The social construction of the terrorist threat is itself intriguing for the ways in 
which it conjures up imagined and imaginable victims. In the UK it is evident that a 
great deal of governmental work has been done post 9/11 to keep national security 
high on the media agenda and to make the public alert to the risk of attack. Indeed, 
successive Prime Ministers from Blair through Brown and Cameron to May have 
identified terrorism as the foremost risk to the nation. Such pronouncements are 
designed to universalise the threat: effectively anyone and everyone is endangered. 
While raising public awareness about the terrorist threat may be considered a sensible 
precautionary measure, there is no doubt that the threat level has been highly 
exaggerated and manipulated for political ends in some Western States (see Walklate 
and Mythen, 2015). As Miller (2016) points out, while there has been a dramatic rise 
in the global number of deaths from terrorist attacks since 2012, in Western Europe 
the numbers killed has steadily decreased since the early 1990s. Looking at the 
amplification of risks such as terrorism it becomes clear that consent for criminal 
justice policies can be sought by utilising and manipulating the symbol of the victim. 
Within this, appeals to the commonality of risk are significant, with the summons to 
take up the role of victim encouraging us all to reflect on our lived experience in ways 
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that invite anxiety. The political construction of crime risks - and the associated 
making up of the victim - does not happen in isolation and is itself shaped and 
vectored by other institutions such as mass media. As Miller (2016) suggests, the way 
in which similarly harmful events receive uneven attention indicates that who counts 
as a ‘worthy victim’ is an issue that is up for grabs. While Western media reporting of 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris was extensive and unfolded in real time, the 
simultaneous murder by Boko Haram of up to 2000 people in Baga, Nigeria went 
largely unreported (see McGowan, 2016: 16-17). Such skewed media reportage 
prompts us to consider the issue of proximity in relation to the politics of compassion 
and the witnessing of suffering. As Frank (2013: 137) posits, to become a witness of 
suffering is to assume responsibility for telling others about the suffering witnessed. 
Witnessing suffering is thus imbued with an ethical responsibility to act. With the 
expansion of mass media and technologies of surveillance we have never been ‘better’ 
placed to witness the suffering of others. Following this thread, (Mathieson, 1997) 
points to a global ‘viewer society’ in which we may be subject to greater surveillance, 
but also more capable of surveying others. The harrowing footage recorded of Black 
victims in the US dying at the hands of police in recent years stands as a case in point. 
At a moral level, it follows that never before have we been more aware of our 
responsibility to act, to intervene where we can affect change, or to oppose social and 
moral wrongs where they subject humanity to forms of suffering. The ‘we’ here is 
typically framed in terms of the West’s response to Eastern and particularly African 
suffering, or the suffering of former European colonies. If we took charitable aid 
donations and international relief efforts to be a benchmark of action, Western 
citizens and governments are not indifferent to ‘distant suffering’ (Boltanksi, 1999; 
Campbell, 2014: 117). Yet the likelihood of victims being rendered visible remains 
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contingent and contextual. If cultural victimology should be, among other things, 
‘attuned to human agency, symbolic display, and shared emotion’ (Ferrell et al., 2008: 
190), the assumption that media coverage of human suffering alone is an adequate 
indicator of how Western citizens understand violence which occurs beyond their 
immediate milieu is limited and limiting. The lack of attention afforded to non-
Western victims in mainstream media is often attributed to the ‘compassion fatigue’ 
thesis popularised by Susan Sontag’s (1977) seminal work, On Photography. The 
possibility of becoming desensitised by frequent exposure to images of suffering is 
potentially heightened in an age of continuous digital media. Yet Campbell (2014) 
rightly challenges the status of compassion fatigue as a universalising, ‘catch-all’ 
concept. Drawing on Sontag’s later work - in which she revises several assertions 
made in her earlier thesis - Campbell suggests that people may divert their attention 
from human suffering as a consequence of genuinely feeling fearful. Furthermore, the 
suffering of others is not confined to the overseas ‘other’. Frequently we are 
confronted with suffering ‘at home’, both geographically and literally. For Sontag 
(2003), the issue of distance, particularly relating to apathy toward images of 
suffering, is now less important. Whether we choose not to act or intervene when we 
witness photography of events thousands of miles away or choose not to intervene in 
matters playing out right in front of us, it is still just watching. We are, in effect, still 
bystanders (Sontag, 2003: 104-5; Cohen, 2001: 15). However, campaigns for victims, 
ranging from Black Americans unlawfully killed by police, to those displaced by the 
war in Syria, have prompted a groundswell of support in many communities despite 
inadequate responses from government. Therefore, we must acknowledge that the 
failure to universally recognise victims, while problematic in a whole host of ways, is 
a complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to ‘blissful ignorance’. In addition to 
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questions of geography, Boltanski (1999) reminds us that there is an important 
temporal dimension to the recognition of distant suffering. He argues for a politics of 
the present which prioritises present suffering and present victims. Disputes geared 
solely toward the past or concern with how future actions may play out, important as 
they are, often miss an opportunity for collective recognition of some of the most 
pressing concerns of our age. Sensitive to the exploitation of past victims for future 
political gain, Boltanski’s argument reminds us that humanitarian compassion must be 
located in the immediate present if it is to reconcile differential responses to victims 
globally. 
 
Theorising the Universal Victim? Risk, Fear and Resilience  
Having considered both the contemporary place of the victim in society, prevalent 
media representations of the victim and some of the ways in which suffering is 
witnessed, it is now necessary to ask whether extant theoretical approaches can help 
us understand the nature, status and role of the victim in society. While risk and fear 
became commonly used lenses of analysis in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century, in more recent times, the concept of resilience has risen to prominence in 
political, media and policy circles. Reflecting these developments, we will consider 
how these assorted concepts both reflect changing understandings of victimisation and 
understand the place of the victim in society. 
The rising presence of risk as a means of framing human experience was both 
captured and developed by Ulrich Beck in Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity 
(1992). The book graphically recounts the destructive impacts of risks generated by 
capitalist neoliberal modes of production, consumption and regulation on everyday 
life. Although the risk society thesis is firmly rooted in the tradition of Germanic 
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sociology, various components have been extracted within criminology to explore 
issues of penal control, policing and social justice (see Feeley and Simon, 1995; 
Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Hudson, 2003). Beck’s summary of the changing nature 
of threat is supported by four major assertions. Firstly, he contends that contemporary 
threats have greater temporal and spatial mobility than the natural hazards affecting 
preceding cultures. The de-territorialized dangers of the risk society - environmental 
pollution, AIDS, and new terrorism - effectively dissolve boundaries of time and 
space. Where criminal justice is concerned, the globalization of crime means that 
‘national security is, in the borderless age of risks, no longer national security’ (Beck, 
2002: 14). Secondly, the risks delineated above are potentially catastrophic. Not only 
do they span the globe, they also generate irremediable effects that victimize people 
far and wide. Third, as the risks get bigger and more explosive, our capacity to 
institutionally manage them diminishes (see Mythen, 2014: 2). As a corollary, extant 
mechanisms of insurance, welfare provision and criminal legislation effectively short-
circuit. Fourth, Beck posits that the fluctuating nature of social hazards disrupts 
established patterns of social distribution and transforms the content of politics. 
Growing awareness of the harm caused by manufactured risks promotes a shift in 
political focus within capitalist societies away from the positive problems of acquiring 
‘goods’ - such as income, health care and education - toward avoiding ‘bads’. This 
ground shift is suggestive of a wider point about social distribution. While the logic of 
the traditional class society is sectoral, the logic of the risk society is universal. The 
key dangers of the world risk society - ecological collapse, nuclear warfare and global 
terror networks - render us all potential victims, regardless of place, race, gender or 
class. Thus, according to Beck, the universality of threats serves to democratise the 
distribution of risk, with the pervasiveness of risk producing a dualistic cognitive 
 13 
effect. While people become more reflexive about their social practices and adapt to 
self-manage the trials and tribulations of everyday life, heightened awareness of risk 
serves to foment anxieties about threats that are out of the sphere of individual 
control. 
The risk society thesis has important connotations for victimology, drawing 
out several prescient trends which shape dominant notions of the victim and influence 
attitudes toward the regulation and management of crime. Beck’s suggestion that the 
avoidance of ‘bads’ has come to replace the acquirement of ‘goods’ chimes loudly in 
the modern world, as our awareness of the dangerous side-effects of Western 
capitalist expansion grows unabatedly. There is no shortage of examples. The global 
financial crisis of 2008, growing concerns over climate change, the continuing threat 
of deadly viruses such as Ebola and Zika, antibiotic resistance, food shortages, 
refugee crises, state and non-state terrorism and ever-present fears over the future of 
nuclear warfare seem only to have ratcheted up a general sense of existential 
precarity. Further, Beck draws our attention to the capacity of media technologies to 
‘socially explode’ hazards, leading to public and political debates about safety and 
security.  
While Beck draws our attention toward the utility of risk as an explanatory 
concept, Furedi’s work revolves centrally around the social construction of fear. 
Furedi’s (2002) approach demonstrates that the tendency to view social experience 
through the prism of danger contributes toward the cultivation of a victim-oriented 
compensation culture. For him, a culture of fear is operating in Western nations, 
encouraged by state institutions and promoted by those working within the media and 
security industries. This culture of fear is characterised by rising fears about crime and 
sporadic moral panics about extreme but rare acts of violence and/or sexual 
 14 
perversion (Furedi, 2002: 23). Contra Beck, Furedi posits that the cultural 
preoccupation with fears that may or may not materialise is deeply troubling. Firstly, 
so far as scientific, technological and social developments are concerned, the balance 
between positive advances and negative consequences becomes distorted. Secondly, 
media emphasis on high impact but low probability risks encourages individuals to 
become more inward looking. Furedi (2002: 5) claims that these processes constitute 
one aspect of a wider set of cultural changes that encourage victimhood in all of us: 
‘being at risk has become a permanent condition that exists separately from any 
particular problem ... by turning risk into an autonomous, omnipresent force in this 
way, we transform every human experience into a safety situation’. According to 
Furedi, the establishment of a culture of fear signals a ground shift away from 
adventurous risk-taking toward a pessimistic morality of low expectation. In such a 
climate, social institutions become hooked on defending against the negative effects 
of hypothetical risks unlikely to bear harm. At the same time, the institutional fixation 
with risk situates citizens as active fear managers as people become schooled in 
undertaking personal risk assessments, constantly weighing up the ‘what if?’ 
questions. Such ‘what if?’ questions lead us not only to imagine ourselves as victims 
but also to reflect on various means of victim avoidance. For Furedi, a society which 
is obsessed with risk endlessly produces faux victims and forgets that contemporary 
Western cultures are comparatively secure and safe environments. Like Beck, 
Furedi’s macro theory building leads him to produce a somewhat caricatured version 
of reality. Although overstated, the culture of fear thesis does enable us to identify a 
burgeoning victim culture and an attendant drive for compensation. Furedi’s work 
locks on to institutional attempts to share the burden of responsibility for crime risks 
with the general public through various awareness campaigns and partnerships. 
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Further, he is more attuned than Beck to the ways in which media news values assist 
the articulation of dominant ideologies. What is accentuated in Furedi’s analysis - but 
downplayed in the risk society theory - is the way in which moral panics about crime 
are used to piggyback political interests and pave the way for new legislation. For 
Beck, the social explosion of hazards in the media is a positive phenomenon, which 
heightens risk awareness and leads to public calls for preventative action. Yet Beck’s 
‘social explosiveness’ is interpreted by Furedi as media sensationalism about low 
probability risks such as terrorism that are unlikely to affect large numbers of citizens. 
Furedi is also wise to the cultural production of the universal victim, but in a different 
way to Beck. Whilst the universal arc of Beck’s thesis leads him to argue that the 
notion of the bystander has disappeared, Furedi justly warns that different people have 
different degrees of risk proneness. Insofar as Beck’s thesis depicts a global society 
vulnerable to novel and catastrophic risks, the tendency to universalize threat obscures 
the differentiated material distribution of risks and downplays the strong link between 
forms of cultural stratification and patterns of victimization. Contra the Beckian 
notion that risks can stimulate progressive acts that improve safety and security, it 
might be argued that acceptance of living in a ‘risk society’ has been expedient for 
neoliberal politicians and serves to bolster social control. Institutional technologies 
can ostensibly reduce risk, yet they can also extend the tentacles of governance. In 
some senses then, Beck’s theory - and its appeal to the universal victim - sits 
inadvertently, but comfortably, with the regulatory aspirations of government, law 
enforcers and legislators. A social environment in which a greater number of people 
feel themselves to be victims is also problematic in other ways. The mushrooming 
culture of victimhood potentially inhibits our capacity to differentiate between victims 
and muddies political priorities (see Ginsberg, 2014). If everyone is a victim of crime 
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then somehow nobody is. Degrees of victimhood can thus be flattened out and 
concreted over, ignoring the undulations of class, ethnicity, age, gender and location 
(Mythen, 2014: 106). People have different levels of vulnerability and different 
degrees of exposure to different types of crime. In this sense, the idea of the universal 
victim is something of a canard, particularly given that primary victimization serves 
as a reliable predictor of future victimization. As Williams (2004: 92) notes, ‘the 
general risks of victimization disguise the greater real risks for some groups. 
Individuals within certain groups may fall victim to many offences in a year whereas 
others in different subgroups may never, or only very rarely, experience a crime’.  
Given their totalising pitch, both Beck and Furedi’s theoretical contributions 
lack subtlety and tend to imagine an undifferentiated public. In both narratives the 
subject is an increasingly anxious, security conscious and risk aware citizen, albeit 
one that is catalysed in Beck’s version and paralysed in Furedi’s. The enduring 
influence of ethnicity, class and gender in shaping perceptions of risk means that 
victims of the same crime may react and respond to their victimization in markedly 
different ways (Zedner, 2002: 429). Going down a level further, those suffering 
multiple victimization might experience their victimization in various shades of 
activity, passivity and/or indifference. Whilst Furedi’s ‘culture of fear’ chimes with a 
society at once fixated and appalled by various violent threats the idea of an all 
embracing ‘culture of fear’ is theoretically reductionist and empirically unsustainable. 
To understand fears about crime and the individual process of ‘victim positioning’ we 
need to address the cultural articulations through which fears about crime are 
propagated and the role of institutions in reinforcing notions of safety and harm. 
Clearly, the range, mix and depth of cultural processes at play will vary between 
different forms of criminal activity, different contexts and different places. It needs 
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also to be remembered that empirical studies indicate that the media is far from a one-
way instrument of communication about crime (see Chadee and Ditton, 2005). The 
media may set the agenda on certain political issues and reinforce existing cultural 
values, but it does not determine people’s perceptions of crime. Media moguls are not 
able to tell people what to think, but they can tell them what to think about. In a multi-
media age of divergent patterns of interaction and engagement with social media, 
unidirectional flows of information are all but a remnant of history. Accounting for 
divergent public opinion around the risk of crime victimization, it is sensible to speak 
of different cultures of fear and to acknowledge that the resonance of certain threats 
will spike and recede over time. We need to be cognisant that ‘the public’ is 
constituted by risk-averse individuals and various cultures of pragmatism and 
resistance in which the anxieties projected by dominant groups are refuted and 
opposed.  
Despite their popularity in the social sciences, the risk and fear paradigms 
developed by Beck and Furedi offer us both a generalised and a reduced notion of the 
victim. They tell us something about ‘ideal types’ in late modernity, but they also lack 
specificity. Both thinkers imagine somewhat apprehensive and risk obsessed subjects, 
some of whom develop a reflexive capacity to manage the difficulties of everyday life 
(Beck), others of which become rendered inert by the bombardment of manufactured 
fears in the media, politics and public life (Furedi). While it would be inaccurate to 
suggest that the cultural dynamics of risk and fear have changed markedly in the last 
decade, policy responses to them have meandered off in different directions. In certain 
policy initiatives geared toward protecting the public from serious threats - such as the 
PREVENT counter-terrorism strategy - the lexicon of risk remains the dominant 
grammar. Strategies such as PREVENT are foremostly designed to deploy techniques 
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of identifying ‘risky’ and ‘at risk’ individuals in order to make interventions prior to 
harm materialising. Yet, in other areas the concept of resilience has gained a foothold 
in policy making. But, what, exactly is meant by resilience?  
Most definitions of resilience hinge on the capacity of people to ‘bounce back’ 
from adversity and adapt to their difficulties or hardships. Yet, in many respects, 
‘resilience’ is as ill-defined as it is ubiquitous. Given the volume of recent literature 
on resilience (see, inter alia, Walklate and Mythen, 2015; Chandler, 2014a; Evans and 
Reid, 2014), our purpose here is not to rehearse the diversity of definitions, but rather 
to explore some of the relationships between resilience and other discursive 
frameworks of governance. Notably, resilience frequently appears alongside ‘risk’, 
‘uncertainty’, and ‘vulnerability’ within policy as a contemporary organising 
metaphor which, much like the risk society and culture of fear theses, projects a 
generalised vista of the ways in which agents negotiate adversity. Yet where risk and 
fear tend to suggest defensive strategies of avoidance, the emphasis within discourses 
of resilience is directed towards positive strategies of durability developed through 
individual and collective coping strategies. Resilience has been promoted in relation 
to numerous active strategies of risk reduction, ranging from protecting against 
terrorist attacks (Coaffee, 2009) to cyber-crime (Herrington and Aldrich, 2013). 
Beyond criminal justice, resilience figures in a divergent array of policy areas, from 
disaster planning and environmental harm, to refugee support frameworks and 
calculations about the stability of financial markets. The discourse of resilience gained 
intensified traction in the UK under the ‘big society’ agenda, masquerading at that 
juncture as a tonic to declining investment in health and welfare services and growing 
levels of economic exclusion. Undoubtedly, the stretchiness of the concept of 
resilience and its apparent discursive capacity to both individualise and activate 
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citizens as unit managers of risk has proved highly attractive to securocrats, politicos 
and government advisors. Yet, there are reasons to be cautious about the existence of 
resilience as a classifiable category of human experience and its manipulation as a 
policy tool. Cleary, mobilising people to pre-emptively combat and defend against 
risks further shifts the burden of responsibility for harm reduction from the State to 
the people. The championing of resilience as a life jacket against risk masks the 
various forms of economic, social and cultural capital necessary to develop positive 
strategies of risk reduction and avoidance. As Harrison (2013) cautions, where 
resilience is framed in terms of one’s ability to ‘bounce back’ from adversities as 
wide-ranging as climate change, ecological disaster, psychological stress, family 
breakdown, and financial recession, we should remain critical and alert to the 
expectations people have of what work the term can do, or, more specifically, what 
they hope it will do. The positivity ostensibly associated with resilience, as opposed to 
the negativity found in academic and policy rhetoric around risk and vulnerability, 
takes hardship, adversity, and even suffering as its point of departure, ‘as an impetus 
for positive change’ (Harrison, 2013: 98). The fact that people can overcome major 
adversity is not in question, leading some to criticise policy perspectives which 
proceed as though this were not naturally the case (qua Furedi, 2008). As Harrison 
(2013) argues, applying resilience ‘in the round’ on the basis that we know people are 
able to respond to challenging conditions does not occur in a vacuum, but rather 
entails policymakers making moral and political judgements. Aside from what she 
calls ‘over-romantic celebrations of resilience’ (2013: 109), which ignore the fact that 
individuals’ socio-economic and psychological resources are in fact finite and do not 
replenish themselves endlessly, Harrison also problematizes popular conceptions of 
resilience which invariably couple considerations of ‘bouncing back’ with 
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presentations of adversity as ‘shocks’. Reflecting on the everyday lives of citizens in a 
UK seaside town between the 2008 financial collapse and the 2011 austerity cuts, she 
notes that for many of her participants, financial insecurity and unemployment 
represented continuity and ‘more of the same’ - to suggest otherwise, as national 
policy initiatives have, is, she posits, to render over existing historical context. 
Assuming shock or even novelty in people’s experience of adversity is, at best, 
erroneous and, at worst, insulting and voyeuristic. 
In as much as discourses and narratives of risk, fear and resilience often 
overlap and intersect, the contemporary vogue for resilience signals a departure from 
previous ways of ‘working on’ victims (O’Malley, 2006: 52) that is culturally and 
epistemologically significant. The potential vulnerability and harm at the centre of 
risk assessment practices is replaced by a ‘flatter ontology of interactive emergence’ 
(Chandler, 2014b: 47; Aradau, 2014), in which surprise is embraced and preparedness 
prescribed. Underscoring this tranche of thought more explicitly, Evans and Reid 
(2013: 84) argue that the ontology of resilience effectively is vulnerability: ‘to be able 
to become resilient, one must first accept that one is fundamentally vulnerable.’ 
Central to these epistemological and ontological suppositions is the notion that unlike 
governance of earlier decades, resilience does not seek to minimize risk and 
uncertainty; it actively embraces it (O’Malley, 2010: 506). While scientific and 
political discourse around risk rely on the modelling of a parallel world, one which we 
can map potential scenarios onto in an effort to calculate likelihoods of harm, 
resilience presents us with an altogether different epistemic regime. Within this 
regime, ‘surprise [harm/vulnerability/catastrophe] is inevitable and novelty always 
already in the making’ (Aradau, 2014: 77). If we cannot adequately guard against 
terrorism, domestic violence, and financial recession through probability calculation, 
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then the alternative ‘solution’ presented to us is, by necessity, to prepare. To this end, 
preparation to deal with the inevitable shocks of 21st century capitalism must be 
prioritised and represents something of an emotional retraining exercise. It has 
become one of the defining characteristics of the identity of a good and responsible 
citizen. As Neocleous (2012: 192) suggests, today’s security politics can be 
characterised by the mantra: ‘Don’t be scared, be prepared’. Not only do notions of 
resilience share many of the deficiencies found within Beck and Furedi’s theses, they 
also contain an important contradiction which limits utility so far as the cultural study 
of victimhood goes. While resilience policies often take vulnerability as their point of 
departure, they do so by positioning it as prospective or future facing. Conversely, for 
victims of crime - particularly victims of violence, terrorism, and war - the resultant 
suffering and trauma that can be incurred has both an immediacy of the present and is 
also, in some respects, inherently retrospective. How things like trauma play out over 
time are, of course, non-linear and far more temporally complex, but nonetheless 
require serious engagement with memory. If we only understand resilience as an 
exercise in future preparation, we miss that which occurs in spite of the policy 
imagination. While resilience as a metaphor and anchor for micro governance can 
never encapsulate all that it might claim to, this should not form the premise of our 
enquiry (Anderson, 2015), nor should we be deterred from trying to understand the 
social and cultural resources that victims rely on in times of hardship or suffering. As 
Cavelty, Kaufmann and Kristensen (2015: 8) posit: ‘there is no such thing as the 




In this chapter we have commented on the continued politicisation of the victim in 
society and revisited the possibility of incorporating deeper layers of cultural analyses 
into victimology. Homing in on the representational and ideational dimensions, the 
possibilities of and limitations to theoretical perspectives have been explored. While 
macro theories will doubtless prove important instruments in the future development 
of cultural victimology, their generality dictates partial utility across different contexts 
and situations. Theoretical perspectives assist us in travelling part way in 
understanding both the mediation of the crime threat and the universalization of 
victimhood, but it is critical that the lopsided impacts of crime across populations do 
not become obscured. We cannot assume either that we are all victims, or that victims 
of similar crimes attribute the same meanings to their victimization. The risks and 
fears associated with being, or feeling like, a victim are not simply a result of being 
located at the sharp end of criminality. Whilst the experiential aspects of victimization 
can be addressed by ramping up micro-level empirical forays, it is important that 
victimologists are alert to the macro structural effects of victim-centric forms of 
regulation and punishment. 
In relation to the bulking up of cultural dimensions within victimology, it 
would be misguided to see culture as a magic bullet through which experiences of 
victims can be deciphered. The same criticisms that have been levelled at cultural 
criminology (see Hayward, 2016) need to be thoroughly addressed if cultural accounts 
of victimhood are to avoid the same pitfalls. Central to critiques of cultural 
criminology is the suggestion of a ‘reinventing the wheel’ which forgets the 
anthropological foundations upon which contemporary cultural studies is built (see 
O’Brien, 2005). Nonetheless, we maintain that there is space to develop victim-
centred research which borrows from both cultural criminology and its critiques. 
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Methodologically, cultural criminology’s concern to document lived experience 
through fine grain ethnographic work and visual methods is to be welcomed. We 
would, however, agree with O’Brien (2005) that the overtly political character of 
crime and criminalization, coupled with the material conditions within which these 
occur, means we have an ethical responsibility to challenge injustice and harmful 
imbalances of power in addition to documenting the symbolic. While the extent to 
which cultural criminology romanticizes crime remains a moot point, Hayward (2016: 
305) concedes that it has, at times, perhaps over-valorised disparate forms of criminal 
transgression as political resistance without always providing a wholly convincing 
case for doing so (see also Hall and Winlow, 2007). Anticipating a comparable fallacy 
in relation to the cultural study of victimhood, it is clear that for many types of 
suffering ethical consequences abound. Just as cultural criminologists may sometimes 
be a little too eager to find resistance wherever they look, cultural victimologists run 
the risk of embellishing trauma and suffering if they become a little too eager to 
extract symbolic potential. Paying greater attention to the symbolic within 
victimology should not emulate problematic elisions in cognate disciplines by 
narrowly aestheticizing trauma to the point of abstraction-cum-by-standing 
(Kansteiner and Weilnbӧck, 2008) or providing caricatured analyses of victim-
perpetrator characteristics which are so easily co-opted and commodified as mass 
media genres in their own right (Rothe, 2011). 
For us, the cultural should be one facet of encompassing victimological 
approaches that also account for social, economic, political, geographical and 
technological factors. Quite reasonably, debates will continue about the extent to 
which such factors can be disentangled. As we have seen, when we get down to 
separating the cultural wheat from the political chaff, the analytical units begin to 
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shade into one another. This said, it is important that victimology takes culture 
seriously enough to grapple with the connections between perceptions of crime, media 
representations and the political economy of risk. There is no solitary cultural fix that 
can be added to reinvigorate extant understandings of the victim. Due to its inherent 
diversity, culture can be operationalised in various ways and employed at many 
different levels. In the first edition of this chapter it was posited that a cultural 
inflection within victimology might encourage research into representations of crime 
victims in popular culture, forms of cultural resistance to victim categorization, the 
discursive deconstruction of the language of victimization and the symbolic 
production of the victim. While there have been tangible advances in these areas, 
inroads have also been made in unpredicted cognate areas, such as witnessing, trauma 
and mediated suffering (see Howie, 2012; McGarry and Walklate, 2015). While the 
quest to develop overarching theoretical frameworks that panoramically capture 
victimisation continues, it may well be that the messier task of drawing out resonant 
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